The “NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS!®” Simply Measures How Effectively Republicans Were Packed
When Democrats and the press breathlessly and obsessively focus on "THE NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS!!!!®," what they are really talking about, with characteristic smirk, is how effectively Democrats packed Republicans into lopsided districts.
The Ds competitiveness gerrymander works like this:
In 2009 the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed that the AIRC is to favor the creation of districts that are "more competitive." The Ds, however, claim that a district is only a "competitive district!" if it is "balanced" or within a very tight range of supposedly being "balanced." Forget about the pursuit of "more competitive" districts on the map; it is now about something the Ds want, something very different.
If a district cannot be made to be "balanced" or hit the Ds’ "narrow range" for competitiveness, then Ds maintain that the constitutional goal of favoring districts that are "more competitive" can be IGNORED. If a district hits their narrow range, then Ds maintain that the district is untouchable: nothing further can be done that would upset the district's delicate and "perfect balance." Suddenly the district becomes "locked in" and the constitution’s other redistricting criteria yield before the Ds' "number of competitive districts!!!®" goal.
By unmooring the competitiveness goal from the Arizona constitution, setting up an arbitrary and narrow range for a "competitive district," and then applying the goal SELECTIVELY on the map, Ds win because they have given themselves license to hyper-pack Republican voters into uncompetitive and often downright lopsided districts...while pretending to wrap themselves in the constitution in the process.
The map overall favors Rs, but the map REALLY favors them after the AIRC creates the requisite number of districts satisfying the federal Voting Rights Act. Then how do the Ds then get then their desired political outcome on the map? How do Ds flip congressional delegations, eliminate super-majorities, or even meet Commissioner Lerner’s extra-constitutional “goal” of a 15-15 state senate?
Do not fear! The Ds have two primary gerrymandering techniques to bring to the rescue. These are tried and true techniques, having been successfully deployed in the past. The first is the offensive use of the VRA. Weaponizing the VRA for partisan political objectives has been discussed elsewhere. The second is the selective use and distorted meaning of a “competitive district.”
Competitiveness is a ZERO-SUM-GAME on the map: make one area of the map meet some narrow competitiveness metric, then another area of the map MUST perforce be made uncompetitive. “We see an area over here where we can make a ‘competitive district’ using our narrow range,” they will say. But they do not tell you that, as a direct consequence, R voters elsewhere on the map will be placed into lopsided districts. Ds will shower the “glories” of being in a “competitive district!” on certain voters and AFFIRMATIVELY AND INTENTIONALLY DENY IT TO OTHER VOTERS.
What are the “glories” of being in one of those select “competitive districts”? You only need to listen to the assertions Ds and their allies make at hearings of the AIRC. Per the Ds, their type of “competitive district” yields a different, and preferred, political “voice” at the legislature, as well as a different, and preferred, association among that representative’s constituents. That “voice” will be “more moderate,” “more willing to reach across the aisle,” and “more responsive to constituents.” The “competitive district” will also have “more political dialogue” with enhanced party building, etc. The foregoing only scratches the surface of describing the wonders of one of these “competitive districts.”
To further illustrate how the Ds exploit the zero-sum nature of their “the number of competitive districts” approach, here is a simple example:
Your state has 1,000 people, all of whom are voting age population. Ten districts must be created that come within five voters of the “ideal” population for population balancing purposes. The ideal population would be 100 voters per district, but you just need to be within + or – 5% of the ideal. Finally, 60% of the voters in your state are registered with Party A and 40% are registered with Party B. What is the range of possible outcomes?
Before we go further, we need to pause to address a trick used by the Ds and other left-leaning groups like the Princeton Gerrymandering Project. They will tell you that the only “fair” result to the foregoing hypothetical is a 6-4 delegation, imposing that as their own, normative goal — a goal that does not exist in the above hypothetical, in Arizona’s constitution, or in any state since the Founding of this country. Arizona’s constitution establishes what is “fair” in terms of goals, and “proportionality” is not one of them. Indeed, Arizona’s goals work AGAINST proportional outcomes. If proportionality is achieved, it is the product of happenstance, not fidelity to Arizona’s constitution.
In our hypothetical jurisdiction, Party A could win all 10 districts. Party A has a sizable advantage and, importantly, no other constraints are being imposed on the map drawer other than equal, or with 5% of equal, population. If other constraints were imposed, such as compactness, contiguity, following county or municipal lines, geographic features, communities of interest, etc., then Party A sweeping all 10 districts would be unlikely, but 10-0 would be the high watermark for Party A.
Now, how well could Party B do in this jurisdiction? If you think that Party B’s best outcome would be four districts, you would be very wrong. Party B could actually win 8-2. Here is how: First, Party B says that it wants to create “competitive districts,” with a “competitive district” being a district where the district is “balanced” or within a very narrow range of being “balanced.” Party B spends a lot of time talking about the wonders that will flow from the preferred type of representation a “competitive district” offers. Party B then “under-populates” eight districts it intends to win (systematic under-population of districts is another gerrymandering technique Ds use in Arizona). Eight of the 10 districts will have 99 voters and two of the 10 districts will have 104 voters. Party B then allocates 50 of its voters to each of those eight “under-populated” (99-voter) districts, using up all of its voters in the process (8 X 50 = 400). Party A will use up 49 of its voters in each of the eight “under-populated” (99-voter) districts, or 392 voters. Party A now has 208 voters left over. Those voters are split evenly, 104-104, in the two remaining “over-populated” (104-voter) districts. Party A has two slam junk wins, with literally no competition, but Party A loses by a whisker in the eight remaining “competitive districts.” Party B has purposefully and artificially distorted the map, treating voters differently, to achieve a desired partisan end.
This hypothetical is extreme to illustrate the points raised above: Competitiveness is a zero-sum-game. In the example, as many as eight districts could be made “competitive” under the narrow definition Party B imposed. To do that, however, Party B had to strategically deploy its more limited number of voters. To win any district, Party B had to use a disproportionate number of its voters, leaving fewer of them elsewhere on the map. In this extreme example, Party B was able to use every one of its fewer voters to maximum effect. Even if population had to be balanced perfectly, as opposed to within 10%, Party B still could have masterminded a 7-3 map: 51 voters would be used in seven districts, leaving 47 voters to be consigned to Party-A oblivion in the remaining three districts. As a consequence of this selective desire to hit an arbitrarily narrow “competitive district” goal, the remaining districts are made highly, highly uncompetitive.
The uneven and unfair zero-sum approach to competitiveness is NOT how it works in Arizona, or likely anywhere else. Arizona’s constitution establishes six MANDATORY redistricting goals. The AIRC cannot “favor” certain voters by excluding or emphasizing a goal, particularly where the “goal” involves issues related to voting rights, association, and speech (the “voice” of the district).
Each of us gets all the goals infused into our districts per the constitution and the Arizona Supreme Court. The goals are mandatory. You are entitled to be drawn into a district that is compact just as much as I am. The voter in Gilbert gets to be drawn into a district that is “more competitive” just as much as the voter in Encanto. The VRA can override the forgoing evenhanded approach to competitiveness, and, per Arizona’s constitution, the “more competitive” goal yields if the proposed line adjustment would cause a “substantial detriment” to the achievement of the “other redistricting goals,” but not to the competitiveness goal. Otherwise, everyone gets to be draw into a district infused by all six of the redistricting values established by our constitution in a fair and evenhanded way.
The need for a fair and evenhanded approach to the competitiveness goal is a reason the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the favoring of “more competitive” districts. The VRA and Arizona’s other redistricting goals will have profound effects on how the districts take shape, and Arizona geography and the groupings of peoples within the state can lead to other lopsided areas. Excepting only the overriding need to comply with the VRA, the AIRC is not excused from applying the mandatory “more competitive” goal fairly and evenhandedly per Arizona’s constitution. Lopsided areas can, and should, be made “more competitive.” Even if the resulting, “improved” district remains somewhat lopsided after applying the goal, the AIRC will have treated that district, and those voters, similarly to voters elsewhere in the state: The AIRC will have worked to make that lopsided district less so, thereby imparting the “more competitive” goal to that district and those voters.
Finally, making a very lopsided area slightly less lopsided is not some sort of futile exercise. It is possible that the lopsided district will be held by the majority party in most elections, but by making the district “more competitive,” the minority party’s “voice” is enhanced in the district. Candidates run, or better candidates run. Money is raised, or more money is raised. Party building and political discussion is enhanced. And, in Arizona House races, the minority party’s ability to employ a “single-shot” candidate strategy is enhanced.
When the Democrats and the compliant press talk about “the number of competitive districts!!!”, they are not talking about how the AIRC fairly and evenhandedly made each district “more competitive.” Rather, they are talking about how effectively Democrats exploited the zero-sum consequence of their selective and arbitrary distortion of Arizona’s “more competitive” goal. They do this to achieve their desired political outcome, i.e., gerrymander, which entails purposefully minimizing Republican voter strength by unfairly and needlessly packing Republican voters into lopsided districts.
